Answer the below question:
5-2: Consider a fictitious future scenario in which the US is on a path to conduct military operations against the Islamic Republic of Iran. One aspect of the operation will be a MEB-sized amphibious assault to seize port(s)/airfield(s) in order to facilitate the introduction of follow-on forces. As an Iranian military leader, where would you seek to invest your effort and limited resources in order to defend against such an amphibious assault? In answering, seek to provide specific ideas and priorities.
4- 4: Consider the section of the reading that discusses the emerging maritime operating environment of the future. Which of the trend(s) described (or another trend or trends that you identify) will have the greatest negative impact on our ability to conduct a large-scale opposed amphibious assault? Is there anything the Navy-Marine Corps can do to mitigate the impact?

6-3: During the amphibious assaults of World War II in the western Pacific, the Marine Corps landing forces had access to profound naval surface fires capabilities in the form of 9-inch, 14-inch, and 16-inch naval guns on cruisers and battleships (for reference, a 155mm artillery round is 6.1 inches). Current naval surface fires capabilities are limited to a small number of 5-inch guns on Navy destroyers and cruisers and expensive Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM). The Marine Corps has pushed over the last several decades for the development of an extended range naval gunfire capability that will allow for the provision of naval surface fires to support the landing force from over-the-horizon (e.g., Advanced Gun System, railgun). No long-term solution has been realized. In light of current technology and the emerging operating environment, should the Marine Corps continue its pursuit of a long-range naval gun to support amphibious operations or should it invest in other options such as missile systems, armed UAS, etc.? What do you assess to be the options and tradeoffs?